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PROTECTING “CROWN JEWEL” TRADE SECRETS
IN THE CLOUD THROUGH VOLUNTARY
INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT COLLABORATIONS AND
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Alexis Salerno1
ABSTRACT
This Comment advances a novel and comprehensive path to federal
regulation of cloud computing in the U.S., designed to protect the interests
of small and mid-size enterprises (SMEs) and business clients generally.
Slated to grow from an industry valued in the tens of billions to one valued
in the hundreds of billions of dollars in the next few years, U.S. public cloud
computing requires greater safeguards and oversight initiated by providers
and the government. Due to the unequal bargaining power wielded by cloud
services providers relative to their SME clients, there is little room for such
clients to negotiate contracts that provide adequate protections for their trade
secrets. And, thus a critical threat to trade secrets remains unaddressed by
current federal law and cloud computing policy in the U.S.—the use of
subcontractors by cloud service providers. Subcontractors pose a significant
and often insidious risk to SME clients because cloud service providers are
under no obligation to indicate their use of subcontractors nor are they under
an obligation to guarantee that the subcontractors will protect their clients’
data to the same extent the providers, themselves, protect their clients’
information.
Since the U.S. lacks unified data privacy law related to cloud computing
and most cloud computing oversight focuses on data encryption, SMEs are
left to rely on trade secret law, state or federal, and contract law to bring
actions against cloud service providers for breach of trade secret protections.
Such suits are both costly and likely to fail because the clients did not
adequately protect their trade secrets. The EU’s new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) recognizes subcontracting risks in cloud
1. JD 2018, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Email: asalerno@pennlaw.u
penn.edu. The author wishes to thank Professor Polk Wagner for his advisement and
mentorship on this Comment.
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computing by requiring cloud service agreements to indicate when
subcontractors are used and holds cloud services providers liable when they
fail to impose the same data protection obligations on their subcontractors as
agreed upon between the client and cloud service provider. More broadly,
the GDPR provides a generous definition of personal data that protects most,
though not all trade secrets, and imposes steep pecuniary penalties on
violators of such regulation.
As the EU and other Asian countries develop cloud computing laws that
protect their citizens’ data, the U.S. should recognize the economic
imperative of devising its own safeguards for its citizens’ data, namely trade
secrets. As a starting point, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), the U.S.’s central cloud computing authority, should
adopt the GDPR’s definition of personal data along with the DTSA’s
definition of trade secrets in its best practices guidance. Beyond raising
awareness about best practices in cloud computing, NIST should collaborate
with the Cloud Service Alliance (CSA) to create a single, certification
scheme to evaluate and monitor cloud service providers’ subcontracting,
trade secret, personal data, and security practices. Such a program would
provide SMEs with a low-cost method to compare offerings. Additionally,
a “red flag” warning system posted on the certification scheme’s website for
each participant, where a provider’s data breaches would be detailed, would
increase transparency in the industry and incentivize providers to maximize
protection for clients’ data.
To boost development of domestic cloud service providers, the U.S.
should offer subsidies to providers willing to both conduct their operations
and domicile in the U.S. Critically, a voluntary Cloud Code of Conduct,
created by industry leaders, small business associations, and academics,
should serve as a means of self-regulation in the industry. Cloud service
providers would pledge to adhere to policies such as disclosing use of
subcontractors and assuming liability for subcontractors’ failure to protect
client data to the level agreed to between the cloud service provider and
client. Given the prevalence of harsh regulation in cloud computing
overseas, namely the GDPR in the EU, industry providers will likely be
incentivized to voluntarily join the Cloud Code of Conduct to shape the
framework for future cloud computing law. Though lawmakers could
impose regulations on cloud computing providers without using a voluntary
code of conduct as a basis for the law, the disadvantages are significant.
Primarily, using the Cloud Code of Conduct as a foundation for federal
policy would enable the government to develop nuanced standards based on
the voluntary Code’s performance in the marketplace. Finally, the Cloud
Code of Conduct could transition to an advisory role as a think-tank for new
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policy ideas and industry education initiatives, ensuring the timeliness of the
proposed remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
Public Cloud Computing is a growing market worldwide that is
expected to increase from $59 billion in 2014 to $205 billion in 2020.2
Services include public cloud- SaaS, public cloud- PaaS, and public cloud-
IaaS.3 Cloud-enabled SaaS resources such as Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) allow businesses to manage central tasks such as inventory tracking
and payment processing along with data analytic capabilities such as
financial forecasting.4 Leading vendors for midmarket and small to medium
size enterprises include Oracle, NetSuite, Workday, SAP S/4HANA Cloud,
Microsoft, Acumatica, and FinancialForce.5 Midmarket and Small and
Medium-Sized businesses surveyed in a 2016 IDC survey indicated 8.9% of
Small Businesses use ERP cloud services and 25.2% of Medium-Sized
Businesses use ERP cloud services.6
In the U.S. alone, public IT cloud services revenue is expected to grow
from $38 billion in 2014 to $124 billion in 2020, consisting of public cloud-
SaaS, public cloud- PaaS, and public cloud- IaaS.7 Lack of transparency and
trust are sighted as major barriers to cloud adoption by businesses,
particularly small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs).8 Most policy and
regulation related to cloud computing in the United States targets data
encryption standards, with the intent of increasing safety and confidence in
the industry.9
However, a significant issue for small and medium-size enterprises
remains unaddressed.10 Namely, the concern that cloud service providers’
2. See Frank Gens, WORLDWIDE AND REGIONAL PUBLIC IT CLOUD SERVICES FORECAST,
2016-2020, Table 1 (IDC, Doc. US40739016, 2016) (on file with author) (referencing Table
1 sourced from IDC Worldwide Semiannual Public Cloud Services Tracker, 1H16 forecast
release, November 2016).
3. Id.
4. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Security Working Group, CLOUD SECURITY
ALLIANCE, (Mar. 7, 2018, 6:53 PM), https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/group/enterprise-resou
rce-planning/#_overview [https://perma.cc/5HNP-ZHGD].
5. Mickey North Rizza & Eric Newmark, IDC MarketScape IDC MarketScape:
Worldwide SaaS and Cloud-Enabled Midmarket ERP Applications 2017 Vendor Assessment,
1 (2017).
6. Id. at 4 (referencing Table 1).
7. See Gens, supra note 2, at Table 9 (citing IDC Worldwide Semiannual Public Cloud
Services Tracker, 1H16 forecast release, November 2016).
8. Portfolio 515: Privacy and Security Issues in Cloud Computing, C. Privacy Risks in
the Cloud, BNA 3 (2017).
9. Bob Gourley, Jane Melia, FedRAMP Does Not Guarantee Data Security, AFCEA
THE CYBER EDGE, (Mar. 7, 2018 6:49 PM), https://www.afcea.org/content/fedramp-does-not-
guarantee-data-security [https://perma.cc/JH5H-A474].
10. Janet A Stiven, Technology Transactions: A Practical Guide to Drafting and
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use of subcontractors jeopardizes SMEs’ trade secrets.11 As the law exists in
the U.S., there is no legal requirement for cloud service providers to disclose
their use of subcontractors in their agreements with clients.12 Since no privity
exists between the client and the subcontracting party or parties hired by the
provider, the client’s legal recourse against the subcontractor is severely
limited.13 A client must rely on his agreement with the cloud service provider
to protect his trade secrets, and personal data more broadly, even when a
provider shares the client’s data with subcontractors.14 For SME clients, their
cloud service providers typically wield more bargaining leverage, leading
SMEs to accept unfavorable service agreements without adjusting the
terms.15 Therefore, trust in the cloud computing space is not high amongst
small and mid-size enterprises and business clients overall in the U.S.16
Currently, most firms decide not to store their indispensable trade
secrets, i.e. “crown jewels,” in the cloud.17 Instead, they typically store less
vital components of their trade secrets in the cloud.18 This Comment seeks
to provide a series of feasible solutions, targeting subcontracting, to improve
trade secret protections in cloud computing sufficiently for SMEs to place a
significant portion of their important trade secrets, if not all of their “crown
jewels,” in the cloud. This Comment will first discuss how traditional means
of trade secret protection, both contract and trade secret law, fail to
adequately protect clients’ trade secrets when data is shared between
providers and subcontractors.
Next, ways the U.S. can protect businesses’ trade secrets in the cloud
by looking to the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) for guidance and relying on NIST to establish and disseminate trade
secret protection guidelines for cloud computing will follow. The EU
Commission’s GDPR recognizes the damaging effects subcontracting can
have on a small to mid-size enterprises if left unregulated and imposes
obligations and liability on cloud service providers who use subcontractors.19
Negotiating Commercial Agreements, Cloud Computing Agreements, in PRAC. L. INST. 4-13
(Mark G. Malven ed., 2015).
11. Id. at 8.
12. Portfolio 515, supra note 8, at 3.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id.
15. See Stiven, supra note 10.
16. Id.
17. Eric Savitz, Is It Safe To Store Your Trade Secrets In The Cloud?, FORBES (Apr. 6,
2018, 2:30pm), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/02/22/is-it-safe-to-store-your-t
rade-secrets-in-the-cloud/#5dc64fd24cb3 [https://perma.cc/M4PM-9JD9].
18. Id.
19. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
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The question arises, whether cloud service providers and market participants
can be incentivized to voluntarily adopt NIST best practices, including those
targeting trade secrets, without imposing federal regulation on cloud
computing. An explanation of the trade protective measures NIST should
recommend for trade secrets will follow. Then, a discussion of ways to
motivate industry-wide compliance with NIST’s solutions and other cloud
computing reform will be provided, comprising of voluntary government-
industry initiatives, mandatory regulation of cloud computing, or a
combination of both.
I. EXISTING LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR TRADE SECRETS IN THE
U.S.
A. Contract Law
Regardless of the type of agreement, clickwrap or standard contract,
there are no regulations or standards for disclosures related to a cloud service
provider’s use of subcontractors.20 Consequently, contract terms generally
fail to specify use of subcontractors and include disclaimers of responsibility
for actions taken by third party services.21 The general trend for cloud
service providers not to disclose their use of subcontractors in service
agreements exposes a client’s trade secrets to tremendous risk.22 This lack
of transparency prohibits the client from adequately assessing the full scope
of service it is consenting to use.23 As a result, clients are left with the option
to either assume this sizable risk or opt not to utilize cloud computing
services and instead develop in-house programs.24
Aside from disclaimers, which clearly abscond the cloud service
provider of responsibility, weak contractual commitments reduce the cloud
service provider’s risk of liability.25 This in turn, serves as a disincentive for
providers to negotiate adequate protections for a client’s data in the
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance), 2016, O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter referred to
as “Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation”].
20. BSA THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, 2016 BSA GLOBAL CLOUD COMPUTING SCORECARD
(2016) 6; Stiven, supra note 10, at 8; Portfolio 515, supra note 8, at 3.
21. Stiven, supra note 10.
22. Id.; Portfolio 515, supra note 8, at 3.
23. Id.
24. See Rizza and Newmark, supra note 5, at 4 (referencing on-premises as being akin to
in-house).
25. Stiven supra note 10, at 4-18.
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provider’s separate agreement with a subcontractor.26 In both scenarios, a
client, especially a SME, has unequal bargaining power with a large cloud
service provider to argue for improved safeguards for its data.27 In some
cases, unequal bargaining power may serve as a valid claim, but litigation is
costly for a SME and is not a likely avenue to be pursued unless necessary.28
Additionally, the client will likely have a hard time succeeding when the
industry practices are slanted in favor of the provider—no requirement to
disclose subcontracting parties and disclaimers.29
B. Trade Secret Law
Claimants may bring trade secret claims under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA), which applies in 47 states and the District of
Columbia,30 or the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), which permits civil
trade secret to be heard in federal court (does not preempt state trade secret
law).31 A trade secret according to USTA is:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process that: Derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use; and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.32
The three elements of a trade secret claim are: (1) the subject matter
must be eligible for trade secret protection, (2) the holder of the subject
matter must demonstrate that reasonable precautions were taken to prevent
its disclosure, and (3) the trade secret holder must prove the information was
taken wrongfully or misappropriated.33 Generally, use of another’s trade
secret is not considered misappropriation and therefore illegal unless it is (a)
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Portfolio 515, supra note 8, at 3.
29. Id.
30. Trade Secret, LII (Mar. 7, 2018, 8:29 AM), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trade_
secret [https://perma.cc/98A6-55GN].
31. Mark. L. Krotoski, The Landmark Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, MORGAN LEWIS
1, 8 (2016), https://www.morganlewis.com/-/media/files/publication/morgan-lewis-title/whit
e-paper/the-landmark-defend-trade-secrets-act-of-2016-may2016.ashx [https://perma.cc/MV
9D-46GK].
32. See Trade Secret, supra note 30 (summarizing USTA’s definition of a trade secret).
33. See id. (paraphrasing the elements of a trade secret claim generally).
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obtained through improper means or (b) entails a breach of confidence.34
In the case of a cloud service agreement between a business client and
cloud service provider, trade secrets obtained by a subcontractor may be
considered an inadvertent disclosure due to the trade secret holder’s failure
to reasonably protect the subject matter.35 Clients are likely disadvantaged
because standard cloud service agreements in the U.S. do not disclose
subcontractor use and small and mid-size enterprises rarely have the
resources to seek disclosure from large cloud service providers.36 Yet, the
subcontractor can argue it obtained and used the client’s trade secrets legally
because the client failed to establish sufficient protections in its contract with
the cloud service provider.37 In the rare case where the client succeeds in its
trade secret claim against a subcontractor, remedies such as injunction and
damages38 fail to address the root issue—SME’s confidence in cloud
computing and trust in cloud service providers’ reliability as business
partners.
II. U.S. DATA PRIVACY LAW RELATED TO CLOUD COMPUTING
DOES NOT ADDRESS SUBCONTRACTING
Beyond claims for breach of contract and trade secret violations, cloud
clients have little to no recourse under data privacy law for trade secret
disclosures caused by a cloud service provider’s use of a subcontractor.39
Generally, no unified privacy law exists in the U.S., instead, there are
specific sectoral laws in areas such as health care and finance.40 As of yet,
there are no “laws or enforceable codes containing general security
requirements for digital data hosting and cloud service providers” according
to a BSA evaluation. 41 Instead, highly specified regulations exist, such as
requirements in California to encrypt databases containing personal
information.42
Where regulation does exist, it is primarily focused on encryption
34. Id.
35. See id. (indicating trade secrets may be obtained legally through independent
discovery and reverse engineering additionally).
36. Portfolio 515, supra note 8, at 3.
37. Stiven, supra note 10, at 4-14.
38. Portfolio 43:-3rd: Trade Secrets: Protection and Remedies, Remedies for
Unauthorized Use and/or Disclosure, B. Civil Actions, BNA 3 (2017).
39. See BSA, supra note 20, at 1-2 (discussing privacy policy in question 1 and cloud
service provider specific law in question 3).
40. See id. at 1 (referencing questions 1 and 2).
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id.
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safeguards,43 such as FedRAMP, which is the government’s cloud
assessment, authorization and monitoring system for services used by federal
agencies.44 Enforcement actions by the FTC typically focus on encryption
breaches or failure to design standard data protection measures.45 The FTC
under Section 5 of the FTC Act has the authority to investigate companies
that fail to provide reasonable protections for consumers’ personal
information,46 and the FTC can conduct special reports such as wide range
economic studies.47
Additionally, the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP),
which is managed by NSA, provides certification for technology products
and is primarily focused on security issues.48 Its evaluation process involves
detailed protection profiles but does not include cloud service providers on
its list.49 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a non-
regulatory U.S. agency, develops standards for cloud computing and the
digital economy in the United States.50 Its standards are accredited by the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), a nonprofit organization.51
In its seminal guides on cloud computing including NIST’s Roadmap 201352
and Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
(Framework), NIST does not have a broad definition of personal data that
encompasses a sufficient range of trade secrets.53 Specifically, NIST limits
43. Stiven, supra note 10, at 4-24.
44. About Us, FEDRAMP (Mar. 7, 2018 9:05 AM), https://www.fedramp.gov/about/.
45. Start with Security: A Guide for Business, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Mar. 7 2018,
9:09 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/start-security-guide-bu
siness [https://perma.cc/5MFN-XQGF].
46. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law
Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Mar. 7 2018, 9:10 AM), https://www.ftc.g
ov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/4RMD-SX4S].
47. Id.
48. See What is NIAP/CCEVS?, NIAP (Mar. 7 2018, 9:14 AM), https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/Ref/What_is_NIAP.CCEVS.cfm (indicating the program includes the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) validation body).
49. Approved Protection Profiles, NIAP (Mar. 7 2018, 9:16 AM), https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/Profile/PP.cfm [https://perma.cc/RN2M-CF3M]; Protection Profile Development,
NIAP (Mar. 7 2018, 9:17 AM), https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Profile/InDraft.cfm [https://perm
a.cc/3AUB-SD5T].
50. NIST Cloud Computing Program, NIST (Mar. 7 2018, 9:19 AM), https://www.nist.
gov/programs-projects/nist-cloud-computing-program-nccp [https://perma.cc/HVZ8-SRW
R]; BSA, supra note 20, at 5.
51. BSA, supra note 20, at 5.
52. NIST Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap Special Publication 500-291, Version
2, NATL. INST. STAND. TECHNOL. (2013) 21, https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/document
s/itl/cloud/NIST_SP-500-291_Version-2_2013_June18_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7EQ
-ZLYA].
53. NIST, Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Version 1.1,
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its definition to personally identifiable information (PII), which is the
following:
[t]he information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
individual’s identity, such as name, social security number,
biometric records, etc., alone, or when combined with other
personal or identifying information that is linked or linkable to a
specific individual, such as date and place of birth, mother’s
maiden name, etc.54
Therefore, a contact list with phone numbers would be protected but not data
on a company’s sales volume or distribution network.55
III. EUROPEAN UNION’S RESPONSE TO SUBCONTRACTING BY
CLOUD SERVICE PROVIDERS
Under the European Union’s new data privacy law, GDPR, effective on
May 25, 2018, trade secrets are better protected by a broad definition of
personal data,56 encompassing any identifier including an identification
number, location data, an online identifier (IP addresses, cookies, and RFID
tags).57 The definition essentially serves as a catchall for “all means
reasonably likely to be used” to identify a natural person, and liability
imposed on cloud service providers who use subcontractors.58 Though broad
in scope, it is important to note the GDPR’s definition of personal data does
not capture all trade secrets. This section will explain how the EU’s GDPR
addresses the major issues posed by cloud service providers’ use of
subcontractors. Primarily, the GDPR mandates contractual protections when
cloud service providers utilize subcontractors, encourages third-parties to
create cloud codes of conduct to enable providers to demonstrate adherence
to the law, and promotes the adoption of certification schemes (either third-
party or yet to be devised government initiatives) to assess service providers’
policies and practices.59
NAT’L. INST. STANDARDS TECH. (April 16, 2018) 17, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP
/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL5T-VBJN].
54. NIST, supra note 52, at 21.
55. Id. at 21.
56. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 28, 2016, O.J. (L
119).
57. Id. at recital 30.
58. Id. at recital 26.
59. Id. at art. 28, art. 40-43.
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A. GDPR’s Subcontracting Standards
The GDPR extends liability to service providers and includes rules
aimed at increasing transparency and responsibility in subcontracting.60
Specifically, a cloud service provider (processor) must receive consent from
a customer (controller) to use subcontractors in its service agreement.61 As
stated in Article 28 (2), “The processor shall not engage another processor
without prior specific or general written authorization of the controller.”62
Furthermore, if the cloud service provider changes its subcontractors it must
notify the client. Stated in Article 28, “[ . . . ] the processor shall inform the
controller of any intended changes concerning the addition or replacement
of other processors, thereby giving the controller the opportunity to object to
such changes.”63
Next, when a cloud service provider uses another processor
(subcontractor) to perform specific processing activities for the controller
(client), the CSP must pass on the “same data protection obligations as set
out in the contract” between the controller and CSP processors.64 Therefore,
the CSP, processor, is liable to the client if the subcontractor fails to satisfy
its obligations. The burden of carrying the “same” terms from the underlying
agreement through to the one between the CSP and subcontracting party, has
challenging practical implications.65 Practitioner Webber points out that
these terms may be impossible for large CSP processors to satisfy because
they make different agreements with clients and then work with numerous
subcontractors, including influential firms such as Amazon and Microsoft,
for backend hosting services.66 Consequently, the CSP processor will most
likely “absorb” some of this contractual risk.67 Webber further postulates
such subcontracting requirement will “likely plague many legal teams,”68
which evidence suggests is true from draft contractual language provided by
60. Id. at art. 28; EU General Data Protection Regulation – Background, DLA PIPER
(Mar. 9 2018 10:21 AM) https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/focus/eu-data-protection-regulati
on/background/ [https://perma.cc/9UWT-4QW9].
61. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 28(2), 2016, O.J.
(L 119).
62. Id. at art. 28(2).
63. Id.
64. Id. at art. 28(4); Mark Webber, The GDPR’s impact on the cloud service provider as
a processor, 16 J. PRIV. DATA PROT. 4 (2016) at 3, http://www.fieldfisher.com/media/399376
5/the-gdprs-impact-on-the-cloud-service-provider-as-a-processor-mark-webber-privacy-
data-protection.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ8U-EVCS].
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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legal advisory firms such as DLA Piper.69
The GDPR’s reach extends to personal data of EU citizens that is
handled within the EU as well as transferred to third countries.70 Specific
requirements must be met for international data transfers to be permissible,
including (a) previous vetting and approval by the Directive (prior law), (b)
EU/US Privacy Shield, (c) binding corporate rules, and (d) one of two new
measures: codes of conduct and certification.71 Liability imposed by the
GDPR is harsh, and in the case of transfer violations, the highest category of
fines applies72—up to 20 million Euros or in the case of undertakings up to
4% of annual worldwide turnover.73 This translates into increased
responsibility for cloud service providers to protect personal data for EU
citizens but does not incentivize increased protection for personal data of
U.S. citizens.
More broadly, the sanctions imposed by the GDPR are amongst the
highest, on a close footing with anti-bribery and anti-trust laws, for non-
compliance.74 Sanctions consist of two categories: (1) fines up to 20 million
Euros or in the case of undertakings up to 4% of annual worldwide turnover75
for breach of “the basic principles of processing,” “data subjects’ rights,”
“international transfer restrictions,” “obligations imposed by Member State
law for special cases,” “certain orders of a supervisory authority,” and (2)
fines up to 10 million Euros or in the case of undertakings up to 2% of annual
69. Example Data Protection Addendum Addressing Article 28 GDPR (Processor
Terms) and Incorporating Standard Contractual Clauses for Controller to Processor
Transfers of Personal Data from the EEA to a Third Country, Version Date: 14 July 2017,
DLA PIPER, CLIFFORD CHANGE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY STRATEGY GROUP, (Mar. 7
2018, 10:36 AM) https://www.DLAPIPER.com (Available for download in document form).
70. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 30, 2016, O.J. (L
119).
71. Caroline Krass, Jason N. Keinwaks, et al., The General Data Protection Regulation:
A Primer for U.S.-Bases Organizations That Handle EU Personal Data, PROGRAM ON CORP.
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Mar. 7, 2018)
https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/12/11/the-general-data-protection-regulat
ion-a-primer-for-u-s-based-organizations-that-handle-eu-personal-data/ [https://perma.cc/R4
DB-PNGV].
72. EU General Data Protection Regulation – Key Changes, DLA PIPER (Mar. 9 2018
10:48 AM) https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/focus/eu-data-protection-regulation/key-change
s/ [https://perma.cc/L28B-7JRW].
73. See Id. (discussing GDPR fines); Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection
Regulation, art. 83(5), 2016, O.J. (L 119).
74. Id.; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 83(4)-(5),
2016, O.J. (L 119).
75. EU General Data Protection Regulation – Key Changes, DLA PIPER (Mar. 9 2018
10:48 AM) https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/focus/eu-data-protection-regulation/key-change
s/ [https://perma.cc/9PG2-J5XX].
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worldwide turnover for breach of “obligations of controllers and processors,”
“obligations of certification bodies,” “obligations of monitoring bodies.”76
Furthermore, GDPR, per Article 58, grants supervisory authorities extensive
investigative and corrective powers such as the authority to conduct on-site
data protection audits and orders to perform specified remediation
activities.77 Finally, the GDPR significantly lowers the barrier for private
claims against data controllers and processors—persons who have suffered
“material or non-material damage” due to a breach of the GDPR have the
right to seek compensation from the controller or processor.78 To reiterate,
the penalties imposed by GDPR are steep and incentivize cloud service
providers and handlers generally to protect EU personal data, but do not
address safeguarding U.S. personal data.
B. Cloud Code of Conduct
This section will analyze a measure created to support the GDPR’s
mission to protect EU personal data—Codes of Conduct with a specific eye
towards subcontracting issues. Strengths and weaknesses of such codes will
be discussed to show the potential actions industry and government in the
U.S. could take to address subcontracting problems for U.S. personal data.
The goal is to provide cloud service customers, namely SMEs, with an
understanding of how members (cloud service providers) are protecting their
customers’ personal data. The GDPR, Articles 40 and 41, allow
“associations and other bodies representing categories of controllers or
processors”79 to create codes of conduct monitored by independent bodies.
A company’s adherence to the code enables the firm to demonstrate
compliance with many of the GDPR’s requirements such as security and
general processing obligations80 and may demonstrate adequate safeguards
for data transfers to third countries if commitments are binding and
enforceable in the third country.81 The Data Protection Board will gather
approved codes of conduct in a register, available to the public.82
76. Id.
77. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 58(2), 2016, O.J.
(L 119).
78. Id. at art. 82(1).
79. Id. at art. 40-41.
80. Webber supra note 64, at 3.
81. Krass, supra note 71.
82. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 40(11), 2016,
O.J. (L 119).
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C. Example Cloud Code of Conduct: The European Cloud Code of
Conduct (drafted with the guidance of the European Commission)
This European Cloud Code of Conduct (EU Cloud CoC) is worth
discussing because it contains language pledging protection for transfers of
customers’ personal data to third-party subcontractors.83 It is significant to
note the Code was designed to address the key “transparency” and “trust”
issues “Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)” face when selecting a cloud
service provider, and subcontracting is counted as one such problem.84
Essentially, the Code is a voluntary device that allows a cloud service
provider to evaluate and convey its adherence to the Code’s requirements
through self-assessment and self-declaration of compliance or third-party
certification.85 The Code’s website provides a list of cloud providers that
adhere to the Code, allowing cloud customers to verify their potential
provider is in fact registered.86 It is important to note, the Service Agreement
between the cloud service provider and customer “determine[s] the terms
under which the Cloud Service is delivered” and does not “replace a contract
between the CSP and the Customer.”87 Beyond added transparency, the
Code posits to provide an added safety net for cloud customers because cloud
service providers must maintain a level of data protection aligned with the
Code’s standards at all times, not merely at signing.88
The Code’s approval is less definite than suggested by the EU Cloud
CoC’s website but stands a high probability of approval because the Code,
without its current name, underwent periodic reviews by and received
drafting advice from the European Commission’s working group on cloud-
specific issues.89 Founding members of the General Assembly include
Alibaba Cloud, Fabasoft, IBM, Oracle, Salesforce, and SAP.90 The EU
Cloud Code of Conduct is managed and administered by an independent
body, SCOPE EUROPE,91 a think-tank supporting co-regulation measures
83. EU Cloud CoC, European Cloud Code of Conduct v 2.0, (May 2018),
https://eucoc.cloud/en/contact/request-the-eu-cloud-code-of-conduct.html
[https://perma.cc/K9S3-LUVW] [Referred to as the Code and EU Cloud CoC within the text
of this article].
84. See id. at 3-4 (indicating the Code is designed primarily for business-to-business
(B2B) cloud services).
85. See id. at 4 (allowing a cloud service provider to pledge one or all of its services to
the Code).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 3-4.
90. Id. at 24.
91. SCOPE EUROPE, https://scope-europe.eu/en/our-scope/about-us.html [https://perm
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in the digital economy. The Code is centered around independent
Governance Bodies comprising of a General Assembly as a consultative
body, Steering Board as an operational decision maker, Secretariat as
administrative support, and Monitoring Bodies as monitor and enforcer of
the code.92 The Code outlines the approval process in broad terms, which
includes a Declaration of Adherence and a self-assessment or certification
performed by an external auditor.93
D. Subcontracting Specific Content
The EU Cloud CoC contains a section addressing subcontracting, the
content echoes the policies conveyed in the GDPR without offering
significant, new content, such as requirements that cloud service providers
demonstrate effective monitoring of data protection practices and client data
handling by their subcontractor(s).94 For example, the Code permits a cloud
service provider to delegate all or some of its processing activities delineated
in the Service Agreement to third-party subcontractors with the customer’s
prior consent, which may be in the form of general consent at the onset of
the Service Agreement (as stipulated in the GDPR).95 No new or additional
consent from a customer is required when a subcontractor is changed or
added, but the customer must be informed of the change in subcontractors.96
Though the Code holds the cloud service provider liable to the client for a
subcontractor’s failure to meet its data protection commitments, these
standards are pulled directly from the GDPR.97 In its current iteration, the
Code does not provide cloud service providers with novel monitoring and
diagnostic protocols to detect potential abuse of client data by their
subcontractors.98
a.cc/MM3W-CFEP] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018 3:28 PM). This is a subsidiary of the German
non-profit SRIW e.V. (Selbstregulierung Informationswirtschaft – Self Regulation
Information Economy).
92. EU Cloud COC, supra note 83, at 23.
93. Id. at 7-8.
94. Id. at 10-11.
95. Id. at 10.
96. Id. at 10-11.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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E. Evaluation of the EU Code of Conduct
Delving into the EU Cloud CoC’s monitoring and enforcement policies
reveals policies favoring cloud service providers.99 This calls into the
question the value of having industry practitioners spearhead a Code
initiative that does not require the involvement of independent privacy
experts and client advocates such as trade associations or guilds.100
According to the Code, monitoring will be performed by a Competent
Monitoring Body.101 The first line of recourse for a customer concerned
about a cloud service provider’s compliance with the Code is to contact the
cloud service provider, which places an unsophisticated SME client in an
unequal bargaining position.102 If the cloud service provider and client fail
to reach a resolution, then the client may submit a complaint to the
Monitoring Body, which will conduct fact-finding for a Complaints Panel.
Such a Complaints Panel will be appointed by the Monitoring Body and will
follow guidelines designated by the Steering Board.103 Neither the rights of
the client during the complaints process are described in the Code nor is it
indicated that such content and additional resources will be provided to
clients online.104 Overall, the Code focuses on the perks of joining the Code
and deemphasizes the responsibilities of member cloud service providers,
suggesting the Code’s creators primarily aim to attract additional industry
leaders to the program at this stage.105
F. Certification
The GDPR also calls for voluntary certification schemes, which
typically entails an audit of the cloud service provider’s practices based on a
detailed set of metrics and is conducted by a properly approved and trained
third party.106 Such a process is similar to a financial auditing process and is
meant to provide cloud clients with additional confidence in cloud service
99. Id. at 33-34.
100. Id. at 26. Members on the Steering Board may elect to appoint an independent expert
and/or trade organization representative as her representative on the Board.
101. Id. at 34.
102. Id. at 33-34.
103. Id. at 33.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Marnix Dekker, Christoffer Karsberg et al., Auditing Security Measures, ENISA
34 (2013), https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/schemes-for-auditing-security-measure
s [https://perma.cc/DS8P-4E9E] (stating that some third-party auditors are governmental, and
others are not).
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providers’ practices and policies as implemented.107 The GDPR leaves the
precise procedure for certification unclear, allows self-attestations, and
instead states that certification may be granted by a certification body or
competent supervisory authority based on criteria approved by either the
competent supervisory authority or the Board.108
A general certification process, according to a 2013 study conducted by
ENISA, involves the following:109 (a) implementation of security
requirements performed by the provider; (b) audits conducted by the auditor
to see if the service or provider meets the security requirements; (c)
monitoring conducted by a monitoring system that checks to see whether the
requirements are met; (d) certification performed by the certification
authority and certifies the service or provider, using audit reports and
monitoring reports “from licensed auditors and validated monitoring tools”;
(e) licensing of auditors by the certification authority, which may require
auditors to pass exams evaluating their expertise or knowledge; (f) validation
provided by the certification board for monitoring tools; (g) accreditation
granted by the governing authority to the certification authorities that
essentially asserts the soundness of the certification process.110
G. Current Certification Related Actions Taken by the European
Commission
Actions currently taken by the European Commission to provide cloud
customers with greater transparency and confidence in vendors include a
collaboration between one of its subgroups, Certification Schemes from the
Cloud Select Industry Group (C-SIG), and the European Union Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA).111 Together they established the
Cloud Certification Schemes List (CCSL).112 The Cloud Certification
Schemes List (CCSL) is meant to provide small to medium size enterprises,
users with limited cloud expertise, with an overview of existing certification
107. Id. at 34.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Cloud Computing Certification- CCSL and CCSM, ENISA, (Mar. 7, 2018 4:13 PM),
https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/cloud-computing-certification [https://perma.cc/WVF8-AG
DF].
112. See id. (stating on the website that, the Cloud Certification Schemes Metaframework
(CCSM), “provide a neutral high-level mapping from the customer’s Network and
Information Security requirements to security objectives in existing cloud certification
schemes . . . .”).
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schemes that could be “relevant for cloud computing customers.”113 CCSL
identifies the “main characteristics” of the listed certification schemes
including the underlying standards, certification issuing authority, auditing
measures.114 Underlying standards include questions about a cloud service
provider’s supply chain and whether it includes third-party agreements,
compliance, and subcontracting arrangements.115
H. Evaluation of Certification Schemes
Regardless of whether a certification scheme is implemented by an
independent party or the government, it provides a means to check the
practices implemented by a cloud service provider. Self-assessments, as a
standalone basis for certification, are a weak safeguard for cloud customers
because the provider reports on its own performance and policies. Instead,
self-assessment and an independent, third-party auditor provide greater
assurances the cloud service provider is implementing personal data privacy
measures. Furthermore, some legal practitioners’ question whether
receiving certification will provide the benefit of reduced regulatory
scrutiny.116 Such a benefit would strongly incentivize cloud service
providers to enroll in a certification scheme. Arguably, the steep penalties
imposed by a violation of the GDPR as well as the low bar for private actions,
likely serve as sufficient motivation for cloud service providers to seek
independent approval of their policies. From the cloud customers’
perspective, an added layer of review provides additional assurance personal
data will be protected adequately.
113. Id. Marnix Dekker, Dimitra Liveri, Certification in the Eu Cloud strategy, ENISA 6
(2014), https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/cloud-computing-certification/certification-in-the-
eu-cloud-strategy [https://perma.cc/AS2Y-ELKW].
114. Id.
115. CSA Attestation – OCF Level 2, ENISA, (Mar. 7, 2018 4:19 PM), https://resilience.
enisa.europa.eu/cloud-computing-certification/list-of-cloud-certification-schemes/csa-
attestation-ocf-level-2 [https://perma.cc/KM77-HRJV] (For example, the certifier CSA’s
profile has a tab labelled, “Part 5 Security Objectives: Supply Chain Management,
Transparency and Accountability,” which discusses third party assessments, audits and
agreements. The schemes listed so far include: Certified Cloud Service-TUV Rheinland, CSA
Attestation -OCF Level 2, CSA Certification -OCF Level 2, CSA Self Assessment – OCF
Level 1, EuroCloud Self Assessment, EuroCloud Star Audit Certification, ISO/IEC 27001
Certification, Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard v3, Leet Security Rating Guide,
Service Organization Control (SOC) 1, (SOC) 2, (SOC) 3, and Cloud Industry Forum Code
of Practice.).
116. Webber, supra note 64, at 3.
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IV. U.S. SOLUTION PROPOSALS
Using the EU initiatives discussed in the previous section as a
framework, this section will propose potential actions the U.S. government
and industry could take to provide greater safeguards for trade secrets when
cloud service providers use subcontractors. Beginning with the
recommendation that NIST expands its definition of personal data to mirror
the one used in the GDPR, the conversation then moves to protective
measures for trade secrets NIST should incorporate in its seminal
publication, Framework. Next, a centralized certification scheme is
advocated for as well as a Cloud Code of Conduct meant to serve as a self-
regulating measure in the industry and subsequently a launching pad for
regulation of cloud computing.
A. Establish Standard Definitions for Personal Data and Trade
Secrets in Cloud Computing
As the standard setting authority for cloud computing in the U.S., NIST
should harness its seminal publication, Framework, to inform the public
about the threat subcontracting poses to trade secret protection.117 Critically,
the Framework should provide ways to mitigate subcontracting risks where
possible and if not possible, note where potential gaps in protection may
exist. To achieve these objectives, NIST should first replace its definition of
personal information118 with personal data as defined in the GDPR because
it identifies a larger range of information afforded enhanced protection, such
as data transmitted with an IP address or linked to an RFID.119 This will
provide a layer of protection for some trade secrets, including information
about inventory tracked with an RFID monitored by a warehouse employee.
Second, NIST should incorporate the DTSA’s definition of a trade
secret in its Cloud Computing Guideline and Glossary. DTSA’s definition
of a trade secret is ideal because it is broad in scope, thereby protecting many
of a businesses’ activities.120 The definition is as follows:
[T]he term “trade secret“ means all forms and types of financial,
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering
information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program
devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques,
117. NIST, supra note 53, at 18.
118. NIST Cloud Computing, supra note 52, at 21.
119. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, recital 30, 2016, O.J.
(L 119).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
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processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in
writing . . . .121
Furthermore, NIST’s use of the same definition as DTSA will increase
consistency as to which components of a business are potentially protected
under federal trade secret law and protected by cloud computing best
practices.
B. Provide Protective Measures for Trade Secrets in NIST’s
Framework
Protective measures for trade secrets should be incorporated into the
“Framework Core” and “Framework Profile” sections of NIST’s
Framework.122 Since the “Framework Core” consists of five essential
functions, “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover,” methods to
address trade secret threats should be contained in each123. Starting with
“Function,” the “Category: Asset Management” should include a
“Subcategory” where assets are identified as trade secrets, then ranked in
order of importance.124 As mentioned, many SMEs identify “crown jewel”
trade secrets as too valuable to place in the cloud and opt to store less critical
information in the cloud.125
The next “Category: Business Environment” should include a
“Subcategory” discussing which trade secrets drive the firm’s market share
and which competitors would be most interested in accessing the firm’s trade
secrets.126 Importantly, “Category: Chain Risk Management” should include
a “Subcontracting” category specifically for third-party, subcontractors in
cloud computing.127 Here, NIST would provide a Cloud Contracting
Checklist to make it easy for small to mid-size businesses to compare the
terms offered by their service providers to optimal terms related to trade
secrets, other intellectual property, and personal data protections and
obligations, the disclosure of subcontracting policies and allocation of
liability.
The checklist would be modeled on key terms provided by the GDPR
121. Id.
122. NIST, supra note 53, at 3-4.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 24.
125. Savitz, supra note 17.
126. NIST, supra note 53, at 25.
127. Id. at 28.
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along with several additions. This checklist would raise consumers’
awareness of the terms offered to cloud clients’ in other countries and
potentially galvanize consumers to demand such terms from cloud service
providers in the U.S. A Cloud Contracting Checklist would include the
following—
General Contract Terms
ÿ Contract specifies what is personal data, trade secrets, and other
intellectual property.
ÿ Contract specifies what obligations (including liability) and rights
the client has, and the cloud service provider has in relation to the personal
data, trade secrets, and other intellectual property.
ÿ Personal data, trade secrets, and other intellectual property are not
shared with third countries unless required under the law of the applicable
jurisdiction, and when permissible by law, notification of such access will
be provided to the client.
ÿ Obligation to keep information confidential.
ÿ *Discloses the jurisdiction in which it processes data.
ÿ Obligation to protect data and ensure adequate safeguards are in
place through monitoring continuously, documenting such monitoring, and
conducting periodic audits. The client will have access to reports from such
activities upon request.
Subcontracting Terms
ÿ Includes a section disclosing whether subcontractors are used or not.
ÿ *Discloses the name and location of the subcontractor, both where
the business is incorporated and where it processes its data.
ÿ Informs the client when it changes a subcontractor.
ÿ Gives the client permission to withdraw from the agreement when a
subcontractor changes.
ÿ Holds the provider liable for subcontractor’s failure to protect data
to the level afforded by the contract between a client and cloud service
provider.128
*This point is important because a firm should be wary of the
jurisdiction in which a cloud service vendor operates as well as the
jurisdiction in which its subcontractors operate because trade secrets, and
data in general, will be at greater risk of exposure in countries with a
reputation for cyber espionage, weak trade secret, and intellectual property
protections, and/or lenient penalties for such actions.129
128. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 28, 2016,
O.J. (L 119) (using the GDPR terms as a basis for the Checklist).
129. See generally Portfolio 515, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing the range of diverse
obligations and data privacy security issues associated with data being stored across multiple
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Then, under the “Function: Protect,” a category should be added for a
cloud service provider certification scheme.130 Such certification scheme
would be created by CSA ideally, or a similar caliber organization, and
would be endorsed and be subject to review by NIST. The decision to utilize
a single certification scheme, when many exist in the marketplace, provides
a consistent set of standards for clients to assess and compare cloud service
providers. Such certification scheme would evaluate a provider’s overall
security protocol, monitoring and disclosure practices, and subcontracting
protections.131 This certification scheme would provide a ranking system
based on the level of scrutiny a firm undergoes, further discussion to follow,
and include a continuous monitoring system. The certification monitoring
board would post a profile for each certified cloud provider on its registry
website.
Essentially, a “red flag” monitoring program would be incorporated
into the certification scheme, requiring a firm to self-report breach of
personal data, trade secrets, or other intellectual property and permit clients
to report such breaches to the certification monitoring board. Upon receiving
notice of a breach, the certification monitoring board would post a “red flag”
icon underneath the cloud provider’s online profile with a description,
thereby alerting clients. A threat ranking system could also be implemented,
classifying threats as high, medium, or low based on the scope of the breach
and provider’s response time.
Next, under the “Function: Detect,” a firm should develop its own in-
house monitoring process, which should include monitoring its cloud service
provider’s certification profile to see if “red flags” have been posted.132 The
“red flag” monitoring system provides a low-cost method for SMEs to
determine whether the breach impacted the company or will likely impact
the firm in the future. NIST should also provide under the “Function:
Respond” a separate “Subcategory” for an impact analysis.133 In such
analysis, a firm should evaluate the breach’s impact on trade secrets and
actions to mitigate the breach’s impact (e.g. discontinuing the use of the
cloud service provider).
If NIST adopts the aforementioned best practices, or similar practices,
SMEs will have stronger grounds to file suit for trade secret violations in
jurisdictions).
130. NIST, supra note 53, at 29.
131. Star Certification, About CSA Star Certification, CSA (Mar. 7, 2018, 6:32am),
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/star/certification/#_overview [https://perma.cc/JMM6-2Q4
T] (providing a basis for the proposed certification described here).
132. NIST, supra note 53, at 37.
133. Id. at 41.
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state or federal court because both the cloud provider and subcontractor
should know the data was not meant to be disclosed and the firm took
adequate steps to safeguard its data.134 Remedies may entail enjoining a
cloud provider or subcontractor from conducting business or granting the
client financial compensation.135 Neither remedy will undo the harm of
leaked trade secrets that may cause the firm to suffer significant loss and
potentially cripple a SME. While individual actions may be insufficient to
protect a firm from major trade secret losses, the goal is to reduce the
frequency with which they occur sufficiently to motivate businesses to
increasingly trust and use cloud computing. Raising market-wide awareness
of the issue subcontracting poses to trade secrets, incentivizing cloud
providers to provide fair and favorable terms, protecting a clients’ data when
subcontractors are used, and providing “red flag” warnings to the public
when such breaches occur will make the market safer overall.
Finally, the “Function: Recover” may include stricter ways to monitor
cloud service providers to better protect trade secrets in the future if the firm
is still viable.136 Again, individual firms will receive the greatest benefit and
chance of recovering from a breach when cloud providers market-wide are
incentivized to better protect trade secrets. A discussion below will evaluate
whether such reform should be voluntary or mandatory.
Lastly, under the third segment of the Framework, “Framework
Profiles,”137 the certification scheme would be a useful tool for SMEs to
evaluate and compare cloud vendors cheaply. According to NIST, such
Framework Profiles are used by firms to assess target vendors and define
mandatory protections the vendor must have in place before the vendor has
access to the buying organization’s systems.138 Therefore, the results of a
vendor’s certification assessment could be included in such a cloud
provider’s Framework Profile, providing clients with an additional tool to
select the optimal vendor.
134. See Trade Secret, supra note 30 (defining the three elements of a trade secret claim,
including that reasonable precautions were taken to prevent the disclosure of the information);
Krotoski, supra note 31, at 8 (noting that the Defend Trade Secrets Act grants remedies in
either state or federal court).
135. Krotoski, supra note 31, at 10.
136. See NIST supra note 53, at 43 (describing how the Cybersecurity Framework would
incorporate learned lessons into future activities).
137. Id. at 4.
138. See id. (“Profiles can be used to identify opportunities for improving cybersecurity
posture by comparing a “Current” Profile (the “as is” state) with a “Target” Profile (the “to
be” state).”).
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C. Certification Scheme
As referenced above, under the NIST Framework Function “Protect,” a
certification scheme endorsed by NIST and implemented by CSA, or a
similar high-quality organization, would lower a SME’s due diligence costs
and increase the quality of information available to the SME. The
NIST/CSA Certification Scheme’s assessment rubrics used by auditors and
responses for each participating provider would be reported in an online
registry, enabling clients and potential clients to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of each participating provider. Namely, the vendor’s
certification profile would provide SMEs with a low-cost way to evaluate
the cloud service provider’s organizational structure, security measures,
service agreement terms, and the use of subcontractors. Additionally, the
“red flag” monitoring program, as previously described, would require firms
to self-report breach of personal data, trade secrets, or other intellectual
property and would permit clients to report such breaches. The public’s
accessibility to provider certification audits and breach history would reduce
the asymmetrical information hurdle faced by SMEs. With greater
transparency in the marketplace, providers would likely be motivated to offer
more secure and consumer-friendly services to avoid reputational damage
and decline in customer demand.
The question remains unsettled whether such a certification scheme
should be voluntary or mandatory. Reform may not happen quickly enough
without federal regulation because it may take longer for the majority of
providers in the industry to comply, which would in turn delay growth in
consumer trust in cloud computing. On the other hand, coupling the
certification scheme with an education campaign for consumers may
motivate consumers to seek service providers that are CSA certified, thereby
driving other providers to adapt to keep up with customer demand. The
additional pressure from Europe and Asia, which have already implemented
data privacy reforms,139 may make cloud providers wary of similar
legislation in the U.S. To delay such measures, cloud service providers may
have a greater incentive to comply with NIST’s voluntary certification
scheme. This may be especially true given the harsh penalties imposed by
the GDPR, as well as the low bar for personal claims.140 If none of these
139. GDPR Resource Center, CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE https://gdpr.cloudsecurityallia
nce.org [https://perma.cc/4PMB-2HUJ] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018 6:13 PM).
140. See EU General Data Protection Regulation – Key Changes, DLA PIPER https://ww
w.dlapiper.com/en/uk/focus/eu-data-protection-regulation/key-changes/ [https://perma.cc/M
4C4-NV3X] (last visited Mar. 9, 2018 10:48 AM) (noting the low bar for personal data as any
information that can reasonably be used to identify a natural person).
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theories hold sufficiently true, then the government could initiate
investigative actions by the FTC.141 Such investigations, industry-wide or
individual, could be used to marshal support for legislative reform that
mandates certifications and imposes harsh penalties for failure to comply.
Structurally, Cloud Security Alliance’s Security, Trust & Assurance
Registry (CSA STAR) certification program is an ideal candidate to modify
because it incorporates international standards such as SOC 2 and ISO and
complies with EU law.142 The scheme evaluates subcontracting generally
and could be expanded to assess safeguards for trade secrets, personal data,
and other intellectual property. CSA’s STAR program consists of three
levels: (1) self-assessment, (2) third-party assessment-based certification,
and (3) continuous monitoring-based certification.143 The “red flag” alert
system should be incorporated into the level three continuous monitoring-
based certification. Relying on a single scheme, as discussed earlier, as
opposed to multiple schemes provides clients with a standard guideline to
compare providers and allows NIST to better focus its attention and oversee
the program. As a means to externally validate the program and monitor the
criteria used in the scheme, such certification program could be reviewed by
the NIAP under the protection profiles (PP) screening process.144
The first level of the NIST/CSA Certification Scheme would comprise
of a self-reporting device, similar to the CSA STAR’s Assessments Initiative
Questionnaire (CAIQ), which asks a series of yes or no questions about data
security, privacy, and disclosure policies a cloud service provider follows.145
The CAIQ addresses subcontracting under the header, “Supply Chain
Management, Transparency, and Accountability (Third Party
Agreements).”146 Two questions are directly pointed at subcontracting
terms: Do you provide the client with a list and copies of all sub-processing
agreements and keep this updated? (Check y/n). Do third-party agreements
141. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 45 (“The [Federal Trade] Commission
may prosecute any inquiry necessary to its duties in any part of the United States and may
gather and compile information concerning, and to investigate from time to time the
organization, business, conduct, practices, and management of any person, partnership, or
corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce.”).
142. CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE, supra note 139.
143. Id.
144. See NIAP, supra note 48 (defining a protection profile as “an implementation-
independent set of security requirements for a particular technology that enables achievable,
repeatable, and testable evaluation activities for each evaluation.”).
145. See CSA CAIQv.3.01, Section: Supply Chain Management, Transparency, and
Accountability, CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE (OCT. 12, 2017), https://cloudsecurityalliance.org
/download/consensus-assessments-initiative-questionnaire-v3-0-1/ [https://perma.cc/NC89-
R4VU] (referring to Third Party Agreements under ID STA-05 in excel format).
146. Id.
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include provisions for the security and protection of information and
assets?147
Here, the proposed certification scheme should incorporate the points
from NIST’s Subcontracting Checklist into a series of questions for
providers to answer. Having cloud providers respond to the questions
inspired by the Checklist will provide SMEs with critical information about
providers’ trade secret protection obligations, subcontracting practices, and
data protection policies. Forcing providers to be more transparent about their
responsibilities and practices will enable SMEs to evaluate whether a
provider is worth trusting and whether providers market-wide should offer
greater protections and better policies.
Key questions adopted from NIST’s Subcontracting Checklist
include—
General Contract Terms
ÿ Does the contract specify what personal data, trade secrets, and other
intellectual property is?
ÿ Does the contract specify what obligations (including liability) and
rights the client has and the cloud service provider has in relation to the
personal data, trade secrets, and other intellectual property?
ÿ Is personal data, trade secrets, and other intellectual property not
shared with third countries unless required under the law of the applicable
jurisdiction, and when permissible by law, notification of such access will
be provided to the client?
ÿ Is there an obligation to keep information confidential?
ÿ Does the contract disclose the jurisdiction in which the firm
processes data?
ÿ Is there an obligation to protect data and ensure adequate safeguards
are in place through monitoring continuously, documenting such monitoring,
and conducting periodic audits? Does the client have access to reports from
such activities upon request?
Subcontracting Terms
ÿ Does the contract include a section disclosing whether
subcontractors are used or not?
ÿ Does the contract disclose the name and location of the
subcontractor (both where the business is incorporated and where it
processes its data)?
ÿ Does the cloud service provider inform the client when it changes a
subcontractor?
ÿ Does the contract give the client permission to withdraw from the
147. Id.
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agreement when a subcontractor changes?
ÿ Does the contract hold the provider liable for subcontractor’s failure
to protect data to the level afforded by the contract between a client and cloud
service provider?148
At this first level, the responses provided to the CAIQ and the proposed
questions above, would be self-reported and therefore would not undergo an
auditor’s scrutiny. In the second level of the certification process, auditors
would evaluate the same series of questions, making the disclosure more
reliable than the self-reporting in the first level.149
The second level should mimic the CSA’s third-party assessment-based
certification process, which involves two independent, third-party
evaluations: (1) CSA STAR Attestation and (2) CSA STAR Certification.150
CSA STAR Attestation is a collaboration between CSA and AICPA,
whereby specially trained accountants,151 from firms such as Deloitte, Ernst
& Young, and KPMG, conduct SOC 2 attestations and supplement with the
Cloud Controls Matrix criteria.152 Though SOC 2 is not designed with cloud
services in mind, it asks critical questions that are directly applicable to
subcontracting.153 For example, C3.6.0, paraphrased, evaluates whether an
“entity has procedures to obtain assurance or representation” that
“confidentiality policies of third parties to whom information is transferred”
conform with the firm’s confidentiality and related security policies and the
third party is in compliance with such policies.154 In addition to evaluating
firms using SOC 2, auditors should assess firms based on the CSA Cloud
Controls Matrix, which addresses cloud specific issues.155 Many of the
questions in the Matrix parallel those in the CAIQ, from level one, and
should incorporate the questions adopted from the NIST Subcontracting
148. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, art. 28,
2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 49-50 (listing the GDPR terms which have been used as a basis for the
Checklist).
149. CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE, Supra note 139.
150. Id.
151. See CSA Corporate Members Providing CPA Attestation Services, CSA, (Mar. 7,
2018, 6:27 PM), https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/star/attestation/#_auditors [https://perma.cc
/2NZT-W6RD] (discussing cloud specific assessment training for CPAs certified in Cloud
Security Knowledge (CCSK)).
152. Id.
153. Cloud Controls Matrix Working Group, CSA, (Mar. 7, 2018, 6:29 PM), https://clou
dsecurityalliance.org/group/cloud-controls-matrix/#_overview [https://perma.cc/E5HB-J7Y
A].
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Checklist.156
This second level of evaluation holds greater weight than the former
because an independent third party assesses the cloud provider’s reported
practices, paralleling the auditing process required for a financial statement
filed with the SEC.157 The Matrix should be used because it carefully
indicates which of the CSA’s standards correspond with other standards,
such as those from NIST, FedRAMP, and the EU Directive,158 providing easy
comparisons across frameworks and cloud provider profiles. The other
independent third-party evaluation should closely follow the CSA STAR
Certification, which assesses the cloud service provider’s security and
combines the requirements of ISO/IEC 27001:2005 management system
standard with its CSA Cloud Controls Matrix.159
The third-level continuous monitoring-based certification, should be
expanded beyond CSA’s framework, which provides customers with
information about cloud service providers’ security practices in a clear
format.160 The “red flag” monitoring system, previously described, should
be included. Overall, the NIST/CSA Certification Scheme would provide
SMEs with free access to information about the security and quality of cloud
service providers in the market-place. Lowering a SME’s due diligence costs
and increasing the quality of information available to the SME will enable
the client to find the most suitable provider available. Furthermore,
increased transparency will enable SMEs to collectively demand better
policies and practices from cloud service providers.
D. Voluntary, Industry Initiated Cloud Code of Conduct
Drawing from the basic premise of the voluntary EU cloud code of
conducts, a single voluntary Cloud Code of Conduct should be created in the
U.S. The U.S. government should encourage industry practitioners to
sponsor and develop a Code that would require providers to use consumer-
oriented contracting terms, comply with NIST’s Certification Scheme, and
conduct business in countries with strong IP safeguards.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Cloud Controls Matrix v.3.0.1, CSA (2017), https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/
download/cloud-controls-matrix-v3-0-1/ [https://perma.cc/46DQ-MDGY] (showing Matrix
mapping along the top row of the excel file).
159. See Star Certification, CSA, (Mar. 7, 2018 6:32 PM), https://cloudsecurityalliance.
org/star/certification/#_auditors [https://perma.cc/Y29X-FNNT] (indicating that auditors
should be accredited to ISO 27006 and are from firms such as Coalfire ISO, Schellman &
Company, LLC).
160. CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE, supra note 139.
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Instead of serving as a compliment to an existing piece of legislation,
as codes do in the EU, a voluntary Cloud Code of Conduct program could
serve as the basis for future legislation. The possibility of future legislation
should be dangled in front of the industry as both a carrot and a stick, so to
speak. Essentially, the U.S. government could incentivize industry to
voluntarily create a Cloud Code of Conduct, by reminding providers that
creating such a code would allow them to establish the basic framework and
standards used in future legislation. Contrastingly, failure to implement a
feasible Code, with adequate safeguards and standards, could result in harsh
regulation of the industry with steep penalties for data breaches and failure
to protect personal data, trade secrets, and other intellectual property. Harsh
penalties already or will soon exist in other parts of the world, such as the
EU and Asia.161 Therefore, the threat of unfavorable regulation in the U.S.
is a legitimate risk and would likely motivate the industry to create a
reasonable Cloud Code of Conduct.
Lessons should be learned from the EU Cloud Code of Conduct, the
most publicized code that developed from an EU working group initiative.162
Namely, the U.S. Cloud Code should have a decision-making board
comprised of cloud service providers, academics, and trade association
representatives representing small to mid-size businesses. A diverse board
will likely drive more balanced solutions that do not weigh too heavily in
favor of providers, as the EU Cloud Code of Conduct presently does.
Pledgees should agree to adhere to NIST definitions and best practices from
the Framework.
The main objectives of the Code’s board should center, as mentioned,
around requiring members to provide consumer-oriented contracting terms,
comply with NIST’s certification scheme, and identify countries with strong
IP safeguards. To maintain consistency with NIST’s Framework and
NIST/CSA Certification Scheme, the terms set forth in the NIST
Subcontracting Checklist should be used. Central to the terms, and inspired
by the standards in the GDPR,163 is the liability placed on cloud service
providers if their subcontractors fail to provide the same level of protection
(terms) for the client’s data as originally agreed upon between the cloud
service provider and client. Placing the responsibility on the cloud service
161. Id.
162. European Cloud Code of Conduct, supra note 83.
163. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 28, 2016,
O.J. (L 119) (requiring that controllers “shall use only processors providing sufficient
guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures in such a manner
that processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the
rights of the data subject”).
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provider is essential because it incentivizes the provider to be more cautious
and selective when using subcontractors.164
Additionally, there should be a condition that cloud service providers
disclose their use of subcontractors, provide notification when
subcontractors change, and include an option for clients to withdraw from
the agreement if subcontractors change.165 To demonstrate compliance with
the Code, cloud providers could be instructed to create a notification system
including a subcontractor registry accessible to clients. Providers will likely
accept the cost of increased due diligence to select a reliable, quality
subcontractor to reduce the risk of the subcontractor failing to protect the
client’s data to the same level stipulated between the provider and client.
Next, the board should require pledgees to comply with NIST’s
Certification Scheme, regardless of whether certification is required by law
or voluntary. To facilitate better cooperation with NIST and the CSA, the
Code board should designate liaisons to each organization. Additionally, the
board should conduct meetings with NIST and the CSA regarding the
certification process to learn about updates to the program, recent
compliance issues, and data security concerns.
Another critical objective of the board would entail identifying
countries with strong IP safeguards and developing a list of countries with
favorable IP policies. Pledgees to the code should agree to only use
subcontractors from such countries. Critically, this requirement makes it a
condition that pledgees would themselves be from countries on the
aforementioned list. Specifically, the board should evaluate whether a
country has robust IP policies in place that disincentivize trade secret theft
and allow for rights of action by foreign businesses/actors. Since trade
secrets are often stolen through such espionage attacks, determining whether
a country’s government has a reputation for respecting data access and
penalizing cyber espionage is critical. Additionally, where the U.S. has data
privacy agreements and similar agreements in place, the board should
determine whether the safeguards adequately protect IP and are being
successfully enforced (as determined by self-reporting from both
governments, independent third-party audits, and general industry consensus
164. See Mark Webber, The GDPR’s impact on the cloud service provider as a processor,
16 J. PRIVACY & DATA PROTECTION 11, 13 (2016) http://www.fieldfisher.com/media/399376
5/the-gdprs-impact-on-the-cloud-service-provider-as-a-processor-mark-webber-privacy-
data-protection.pdf [https://perma.cc/82HW-EXCD] (discussing processors’ and controllers’
duties and responsibilities under the GDPR).
165. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 28, 2016,
O.J. (L 119) (stating that controllers “shall inform the controller of any intended changes
concerning the addition or replacement of other processors, thereby giving the controller the
opportunity to object to such changes”).
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surveying). Such a requirement will likely increase the cost of using
subcontractors because clients will have to select higher quality third-parties.
Consequently, providers may be more selective in choosing their
subcontractors to justify the cost or carry-out these functions themselves,
thereby reducing the risk of trade secret violations.
Monitoring and enforcement of the Code should aim to instruct more
than punish.166 Specifically, a separate Code committee should be
responsible for monitoring pledgees’ compliance with the code and NIST
certification status.167 Another committee responsible for enforcement of the
Code should develop a warning system for minor first-time offenses and an
education program for more significant offenses that can be corrected
through training.168 If the offense is significant and cannot be corrected or
should not be corrected through training, then removal from the Code is
warranted and notification will be provided in the program’s public
registry.169
E. Federal Initiative: Subsidies for U.S. Cloud Computing
Infrastructure Development
The government should offer subsidies for cloud computing
infrastructure development to encourage growth of domestic cloud
computing providers and domestic subcontractors. The U.S. risks falling
behind, as other countries continue to develop their own regulations and
incentives for cloud computing that protect their citizens’ data and favor their
citizens’ businesses.170 Businesses contracting with providers in countries
with both poor protections for IP and reputations for cyber espionage pose a
critical threat to small and mid-size enterprises. According to a 2016
Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report, more than half of breaches were
the result of cyber espionage in the manufacturing industry.171 Development
166. See European Cloud Code of Conduct, supra 83, at 30 (contrasting the EU CoC’s
enforcement policies).
167. See Id. at 35 (paralleling the EU CoC’s use of a separate monitoring body).
168. See Id. at 35-36 (implementing a warning system and education program for offenses
committed by pledgees will provide constructive guidance for pledgees and improve
consumer trust; neither proposal is included in the EU CoC).
169. See Id. (separating infractions into those that can be remedied without removal from
the registry and those that cannot offers more specific guidance about acceptable behavior to
pledgees than the EU CoC, which does not make this distinction).
170. See CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE, supra note 139 (discussing “[t]he new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)” and that “[t]he regulation will apply to all industries across
the European Union.”).
171. Frank M. Groom, Stephan S. Jones, Enterprise Cloud Computing for Non-Engineers,
CRC PRESS, “Security Considerations” (2018), https://books.google.com/books?id=NGNRD
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of a robust network of U.S. based cloud service providers and subcontractors
could reduce the risk posed by reliance on foreign cloud service providers.
Subsidies could be used to spur development of new providers and
incentivize current providers to relocate to the U.S. Reducing the cost of
operating a cloud service in the U.S. would allow firms to keep their prices
competitive with foreign providers, enabling small to mid-size enterprises to
choose a provider based on quality over cost.
F. Federal Regulation of Cloud Computing with Voluntary, Industry
Initiatives
Federal law regulating cloud computing should codify NIST’s
Framework and glossary of terms, which include the proposed definitions
for personal data and trade secrets. Assuming the industry creates a
successful voluntary Cloud Code of Conduct, federal law would adopt most
of the framework. The Code’s central requirements for pledgees to provide
consumer-oriented contracting terms, comply with NIST’s Certification
Scheme, and conduct business in countries with strong IP safeguards for U.S.
clients will provide the foundation for the federal law. Because providers
already underwent major reforms to comply with the Code, the burden of
complying with the law will be significantly reduced. Though the process
of adhering to the Code’s standards would be costly and time-consuming,
providers could have the option to make changes at their own pace and apply
for membership when ready without the risk of facing financial penalties for
failure to comply by a specified deadline.
The consumer-oriented contracting terms from the Code, adopted from
NIST’s Subcontracting Checklist, should be codified in this federal law.
Penalties for violations should fall on a sliding scale, with fines up to $5
million dollars, or 1% of annual worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.172
Fines would be higher for certain offenses, such as (1) failure to ensure
subcontractors protect data to the same level as stipulated between client and
provider, and (2) failure to provide and/or follow terms protecting trade
secrets, personal data, or other intellectual property law. A private right of
wAAQBAJ&pg=SA2-PA50&lpg=SA2-PA50&dq=cloud+computing+trade+secret+threat+
by+cyber+espionage&source=bl&ots=qhh3Hj5oLw&sig=zS9MGMa2ExCgCqDF5XJ5BfjI
zSk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwih8t6dqqbaAhXD31QKHWLJDkAQ6AEIPTAD#v=on
epage&q=cloud%20computing%20trade%20secret%20threat%20by%20cyber%20espionag
e&f=false [https://perma.cc/35FF-EP7S].
172. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 83, 2016,
O.J. (L 119) (serving as the basis for fines in the proposed U.S. legislation, but penalties would
be less severe in the U.S.).
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action would also exist for economic losses.173 The Code’s structure bolsters
a client’s claim under the DTSA for trade secret violations because the nature
of the agreement, as stipulated under the law, demonstrates the client took
adequate measures to safeguard the trade secrets.174 Additionally, a client
would have separate right to a breach of contract claim.175
Compliance with the NIST/CSA Certification Scheme would also be
mandatory under federal regulation, as in the Code. To screen the widest
pool of market participants, certification should be mandatory for any cloud
provider conducting business with the U.S. A penalty system should be
imposed based on a stratified structure—$500 thousand to $1 million for
failure to make an initial submission for certification, $500 thousand for
failure to follow recommendations provided by the certification board, and
$200 thousand to $2 million for repeated “red flag” offenses or a severe data
breach that was willful, reckless, or negligent.176
Arguably, the most controversial condition of the Code would be
included in the federal law—cloud service providers must conduct business
in countries with strong IP safeguards for U.S. clients based on a pre-
approved list. The criteria for the list would parallel the Code’s, but would
offer an appeals process177 for providers willing to undergo an independent,
third-party audit of their business practices and the infrastructure they have
in place to protect trade secrets, personal data, and other IP. Violations of
the law would result in financial penalties for both the client and provider
unless the client was deceived into contracting with a non-approved vendor.
Providers who deceive clients would incur financial penalties under this law
and would likely face fraud charges as well.178
If and when the law is implemented, the Code should transition to an
advisory “think-tank.” The Code board would be responsible for hosting
education initiatives in collaboration with the government and NIST to
provide members with the most recent industry risks and best practices. The
Code board would host member forums to discuss solutions to security
173. Id.
174. LII, supra note 30; Krotoski, supra note 31, at 8.
175. Gourley, supra note 9, at 4-13.
176. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 83, 2016,
O.J. (L 119) (serving as the basis for fines in the proposed U.S. legislation, but penalties would
be less severe in the U.S.).
177. See EU General Data Protection Regulation – Key Changes, DLA PIPER (Mar. 9,
2018 10:48 AM), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/focus/eu-data-protection-regulation/key-
changes/ [https://perma.cc/NE4U-FPYV] (discussing the approval process for international
data transfers; the proposal here is loosely inspired by the GDPR’s strict data transfer
measures).
178. 18 U.S. Code § 1341.
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threats, and trade secret violations. Additionally, the board would propose
initiatives for members to vote, by majority of those attending, to implement
new standards to comply with to better protect trade secrets in the cloud.
Both the board’s forums and new standards would serve as a testing ground
for new reforms and government legislation, thereby fostering continuous
improvement of cloud computing regulation.
G. Federal Regulation of Cloud Computing Without Voluntary,
Industry Initiatives
If federal laws were developed without implementing a voluntary Code
of Conduct first, then the legislation may receive less support from the
industry because market-participants would not have as much say in the
law’s framework. Critically, providers would not have the grace period the
Code would afford to implement the required safeguards. Instead, providers
may have to rush to implement costly protective measures or risk heavy
penalties for failure to comply with the legislation’s prescribed deadline.
The development of the law itself may be more adversarial and risky for
cloud service providers because the law may rely on FTC studies and
enforcement actions179 against providers to develop the foundation for the
Code. Therefore, the Code may take a more punitive tone, with steeper
financial penalties as in the GDPR, for violation of the law.180
The federal law would adopt the terms from NIST’s Subcontracting
Checklist, as above. Certification would also be mandatory, for the reasons
previously discussed, as would a similar requirement that cloud providers
conduct business in countries with adequate IP safeguards based on a pre-
approved list. However, an appeals process would be unlikely because it
would be too much of an added risk on an already untested piece of
legislation. Without the Code of Conduct, the legislation would lack prior
market screening and feedback, making nuanced solutions challenging in the
first iteration of the law. Consequently, significant amendments may be
required of the legislation. Additionally, there is a lost opportunity to
transform an industry-created code into a think-tank and industry advisor to
the government for future reform and legislation.
179. FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 45.
180. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 83, 2016,
O.J. (L 119) (describing penalty structure.).
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CONCLUSION
Adoption of cloud computing is growing, but client trust remains low.
Trust is especially low amongst small to mid-size businesses, who stand to
lose their “crown jewel” trade secrets and, ultimately, their business if their
trade secrets are leaked. Neither contract law nor trade secret law provide
adequate recourse for SMEs if their data is breached in the cloud, namely by
a subcontractor. Furthermore, the U.S. lacks cloud computing regulation,
which more generally places U.S. SMEs and U.S. business clients at a
disadvantage because other countries have increasingly adopted cloud
computing regulations that protects their citizens’ interests, including
subcontracting practices. To remain competitive in the cloud computing
industry and protect U.S. clients’ trade secrets, NIST should expand its
definition of personal data to match the one provided in the GDPR and
incorporate the DTSA’s definition of trade secret in its seminal work,
Framework. NIST should collaborate with CSA to create a certification
scheme to evaluate and monitor cloud service providers’ subcontracting,
trade secret, personal data, and security practices. Subsidies should be
offered to U.S. based providers by the government to incentivize growth of
domestic cloud services. Optimally, a voluntary Cloud Code of Conduct
should be established as a means of self-regulation in the industry. This
Code should serve as the basis for cloud computing legislation, and transition
to a think-tank function after legislation is passed to help the U.S. identify
and respond to the latest issues in cloud computing.
